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ABSTRACT 
 
How Migrant Parents in Beijing Care for Their Children: 
A Comparison Study on Parenting Strategies Between Poor and Not-so-poor Migrant 
Parents 
 
by 
 
Qiao Li 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of how internal migration in 
globalizing China shapes migrant parents’ decision to raise their children. The case study 
focuses on how do poor and not-so-poor migrant parents care for their children both from 
afar and close by. The findings on which it is based come from three main sources. The first 
consisted of twenty semi-structured interviews with migrant parents and their now-adult 
children from different social-economic backgrounds in Beijing, China. The second source 
comes from participant observation at a migrant children’s school in Beijing. The third 
source comes from archival research in California, where I gather the push-pull factors for 
migration within China, as well as the institutional barriers that prevents rural migrant 
parents and their children from utilizing social services in urban cities. Drawing from 
existing scholarship on China’s globalizing economy, hukou reform, feminization of 
migration, and children of migration, I attempt to examine what does migrant family 
structures reveal about China’s institutional discrimination? How do poor and not-so-poor 
migrant parents in Beijing care for their children? And how does migration effect now-adult 
children’s outlook on life and work? By studying this topic, I hope to deepen the 
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understanding of the social cost of migration on family relationships and children behind 
China’s aggressive economic development. Moreover, this study aims to elevate the 
discussion of migrant families from the margins of scholarly research to a position of greater 
centrality. 
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Figure 1 - Map of People’s Republic of China. Source: University of Texas Library 
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I. Overview 
June 2014 – In the northeastern city of Qinhuangdao, a migrant father who recently lost 
his job as a construction worker, attempted to rob a woman and her six-year-old daughter. 
When the little girl offered 2 yuan ($0.35 cents) from her own pocket and said, “uncle, 
here’s 2 yuan, please don’t hurt my mother. Take my money, and you can go home.” The 
robber dropped his knife, and tears began to streak down his cheeks. He later confessed to 
the police that the little girl had reminded him of his own daughter back home (Gong, 2014).  
The stress of living apart from their children combined with the pressure to provide for 
the family, as experienced by this migrant father, exemplifies similar issues faced by many 
migrant parents in urban China. This example also highlights the on-going systemic 
problems that Chinese policymakers have failed to address. 
Since China pursued economic liberalization in 1978 under Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership, it has experienced an unprecedented growth. In just thirty-two years, China 
transformed itself from one of the poorest countries to holding the world’s second largest 
economy. Although China pursued a different path than what Chairman Mao Zedong had 
envisioned, his slogan “man can conquer nature” (ren ding sheng tian) has certainly 
manifested itself through the dramatic reconstruction of the country’s economy. The 
booming manufacturing, construction, and domestic service industries demanded endless 
low-wage labor to fulfill the need of export productions and urbanization projects.  
As rural peasants come to the city to search for job opportunities, they face institutional 
and social barriers that prevent them from getting equal access to resources. Migrant 
  3 
workers face discrimination, loneliness, and isolation in their new environment, and migrant 
parents struggle to care for their children from afar. 
While research has shown migrant children in general face more obstacles in education 
and health care issues, it is less clear how does migration affects parent-children 
relationships. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of social cost in China’s 
aggressive economic development by examining the following questions about migration: 1. 
What does the structure of a typical migrant family in Beijing tell us about institutional 
discrimination? 2. Base on different social-economic statuses, how do migrant families in 
Beijing care for their children, what obstacles do they face, and how do these obstacles 
reveal about the growing social-economic divide amid China’s developing economy? 3. 
How does migration affect family relationships and children?  
Policy makers are at a critical position to address the issues faced by migrant families, 
because current policies in China are aimed to manage migration, not to uproot the problems 
faced by many migrant families. Therefore, seeing the diversity of their experience and the 
specific issues they face will be instrumental in formulating thoughtful and effective policies 
that can improve the livelihood of migrant families through strengthening social services. 
Specifically, policy makers should focus on how to minimize hukou barriers so it can be 
easier for migrants to move, work, and attend school in a different city; strengthen social 
services in both urban and suburban China; and prioritize on building strong family values 
over materialism and consumption. 
China’s rapid urbanization since post reform era has created countless job opportunities 
for migrant workers who were once rural peasants in the countryside. Migrant workers who 
live and work in a place other than where their household registration (hukou) resides, are 
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referred to as the “floating population” in their new environment. Hukou is a household 
record system that officially identifies a person as a resident of an area. Along with their 
residency, the location of hukou also determines one’s access to social services, education 
and work options. Hukou is often regarded as a caste system that bars rural population from 
obtaining urban residency and social services, including medical care and education for rural 
children in urban cities.  
According to the National Statistic Bureau of China (2014), there are currently 245 
million floating workers in China, including children. Migrant workers are attracted to 
developing megacities because they can offer more economic opportunities, and once they 
are settled in their new environment, they tend to expand their local network by bringing 
more family members and village kin to work alongside them in the city. The top receiving 
cities for migrant workers in China are Shanghai, Beijing, Shengzhen, and Dongguan (Value 
line, 2014). In 2014, China announced its latest plan to integrate more rural population into 
urban living by populating second or third-tier cities, those are, smaller cities located 
primarily in central China, which have been boosted by the Chinese stimulus package to 
build better highways and faster trains to increase access to these areas. Experts estimate that 
by 2020, 100 million more people will move to these cities (Johnson, 2014).  
This unprecedented migration has created numerous challenges for migrant families to 
care for their children. Because rural migrants lack urban hukou, many migrant parents 
choose to leave their children behind in the care of grandparents or older siblings. China 
Labour Bulletin (2013), a labor advocacy group based in Hong Kong, reports that as of 
2013, 61 million children were left behind by parents who have migrated to work in China’s 
globalizing economy.  
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Migrant families face tremendous challenges in balancing a work life while caring for 
their family from afar, yet existing scholarship has dedicated very little attention to discuss 
how to care for a generation of left behind children. Much scholarly research has focused on 
unmarried migrant workers, and their agencies to break free from the past in order to create 
a better future in the new China (Pun, 2005; Jacka, 2005). Married migrant women, on the 
other hand, are often depicted as backward and easy to become victims of domestic abuse. 
Unlike young, single migrant girls who are adventurous and eager to fit in, married migrants 
are seen as possessing very little will to improve their living and working conditions (Jacka, 
2005). 
For most, if not all migrant parents, they can never break free from their past, because 
parts of them remain back home with their children. Even for those who have brought their 
children along and settled in the city, they never cease to worry about their children’s future. 
Migrant parents work under heavy pressure to support their children; they worry about their 
children’s health, studying progress, and their risk of being bullied; they also long for the 
time to see them again.  
Not having an outlet to express their bitterness, migrant parents often find themselves 
unable to integrate, and do not desire to venture out of their enclaves in the city, thus further 
distancing themselves from the lives and culture of urbanites. On a crowded street in 
Beijing, where a luxury car can be waiting at a traffic light alongside a tricycle, the lives of 
the haves and have-nots are deeply intertwined spatially, yet invisible borders divide them 
institutionally, economically, and culturally. Migrant workers, especially migrant parents, 
are selectively subjugated to bear the burden of China’s economic development.  
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Migrant parents’ oppression has encompassed three interdependent dimensions. First, 
the exploitation migrant parents’ labor is essential to China’s economic growth. Migrant 
parents work at low wages and have little to none workforce protection in China’s 
megacities to generate profit for factories and local government (Whyte, 2010). Second, the 
hukou system acts as a political oppression, which denies migrant parents’ rights to utilize 
social services in their new environment, including medical care for themselves, and 
affordable public education system for their children (Hunnum, Wang, Adams, 2008; Yip, 
2010: 152; Wu, 2010: 74; Jacka, Kipnis, Sargeson, 2013). Third, the cultural stereotype 
portraying migrant parents as uneducated, weak, and backward, combined with the cultural 
expectation for migrant mothers to care for their left behind family and children, further 
contributed to migrant parents’ oppression and China’s growing social-economic divide 
(Pun, 2005).  
If policy makers ignore the plight of migrant families and a generation of left-behind 
children, China will find itself in the peril of social turmoil in the next few decades to come. 
Given the growing interdependence between China and the world, it is definitely in the 
country’s best interest to address these issues now.  
Looking beyond China’s border – in our globalizing world – transnational families are 
fueling the growth of global economic development: Filipinas in Dubai, Hong Kong; 
Mexicana in Los Angeles; Turkish migrants in Frankfurt; Polish families in Ireland. Many 
scholars have written on the harsh conditions migrant families face, and the feminization of 
migration, but very few have focused on the growing social-economic divide within migrant 
population, and how social policies shape their children’s life chances. 
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By looking beyond institutional constraints like the inflexibility of hukou, this paper 
intends to examine how do poor and not-so-poor migrant families manage to care for their 
children. By looking at the issues that concern different migrant families, this paper aims to 
shed light on the growing social-economic divide between the haves and have-nots in 
globalizing China. Finally, through learning migrants’ agency in reshaping their family’s 
destiny, discussion can be drawn on how migrant families are contributing to the 
manufacturing of desires to support domestic consumption. A cornerstone of China’s 12th 
Five-Year Plan – a set of national economic and social development strategies for years 
from 2011 to 2015 – is the goal to increase domestic consumption. According to the Plan’s 
Policy Direction, it aims to:  
“…establish long term mechanism of expanding domestic demand. Create positive 
consumption environment by actively yet steadily accelerating urbanization, implementing 
the strategy of employment as priority, deepening the distribution reform and improving 
social security system, gradually make the overall size of our domestic market ranks among 
the largest internationally” (Confederation of British Industries, 2011) 
By buying into the national campaign to build a strong domestic consumption market, 
migrant parents are once again being used to fulfill political and economic agendas. In the 
pursuit of “buying one’s way to happiness,” migrant parents are losing out on forging a 
strong emotional connection with their children.  
This thesis will include four chapters. Chapter 1 provides the literature and historical 
review of migration since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Chapter 2 states 
the research design. Chapter 3 states the findings, and Chapter 4 recommends policies that 
would emphasize social development as a form of economic development. 
Findings in my study derive from participant observation, archival research, and in depth 
interviews with twenty migrant parents and their adult children during my fieldwork in 
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Beijing from September to December 2014. The results show that poorer migrants have 
fewer opportunities to change their working and living situation, and as a result they tend to 
endure longer years of separation with their children than not-so-poor migrants. It is also 
much harder for children of poorer migrants to achieve upward social mobility than children 
of wealthier migrants, thus further widening the social-economic gap within society. The 
third finding reveals the deep emotional distress expressed by both groups of migrants and 
their children. Migrant mothers across the board bear tremendous guilt for leaving their 
children behind. Children, either left-behind or have reunited with their parents, feel a strong 
emotional disconnection with their parents.  
 In light of my findings, migrant mothers had to leave their children behind to work in 
a different city in order to lift their family out of poverty. However, because traditional 
gender roles confined a woman’s space to only occupy the domestic sphere, migrant 
mothers’ decision to work away harbored social stigmatizations, which have brought them 
shame and guilt for being bad mothers.  
The ability of migrant parents to care for their children in their new environment is 
directly affected by access to social services. By honing in on the stories of twenty migrant 
families, this paper aims to examine how migrant families are integrated in Beijing, as well 
as some of the issues they face in their everyday life.  
Understanding how migrant parents in Beijing care for their children will not only 
enable us to see how gendered expectations have not changed amid women’s growing 
responsibility to provide for the family, it will also allow us to learn about issues faced by 
migrant families base on different social-economic statuses. Furthermore, this study 
attempts to shed light on what is the social cost behind China’s aggressive economic 
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development, and concludes with a few policy recommendations for legislators in China as 
well as China scholars at large. 
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II. Background  
Figure 2: Migrant women preparing grapes for sale. Source: Qiao Li, 2014 
 
A. Economic Globalization 
Mass migration across the globe is historically generated by push and pull factors. The 
pushing mechanism comes out of domestic pressure, such as poor economic conditions force 
people to seek better job opportunities elsewhere. The pulling factors come from a growing 
demand for a large and cheap labor in the receiving countries. Starting in the second half of 
the 20th century, both of these forces have been accelerated by globalization.  
Globalization has unleashed unprecedented forces to integrate market capital. Ease of 
communication and transportation allows goods to be made and shipped all around the 
world within moments of decision-making. The rise of transnational corporations like Wal-
Mart reshapes the characteristics of 21st century business model (Lichtenstein, 2005). Unlike 
the 20th century business model employed by General Motors, who owned its production in 
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the U.S., claimed full liability, and engaged in labor negotiations, the 21st century business 
model capitalizes on outsourcing production worldwide, to bidders with the lowest price; 
they claim limited liabilities, ignore externalities such as environmental damage,  
Economic globalization has fostered a new environment for transnational corporations to 
grow, and the influence of Chinese corporations have increased on the global stage in recent 
years. In 2014, Sinopec Petroleum Group ranked number 3 on Fortune Global Top 500 
corporations, the highest of any Chinese company on the list, with annual operating revenue 
of $457 billion, followed by China National Petroleum, with a 2014 operating revenue of 
$432 billion (Fortune). The revenues of these two corporations in 2014 are higher than the 
GDP of Austria at $428 billion and Denmark at $336 billion; if these two corporations were 
countries, their revenues would rank them at 27th and 28th places out of 196 countries 
worldwide (World Bank, 2014). Transnational corporations have become increasingly 
important in forging the political and economic directions in the world, at the same time, 
they are also demanding a new kind of political protection from their home countries. Saskia 
Sassen (1996) argued that globalization has formed a new kind of citizenship. Building from 
the traditional electoral process, where citizens hold their government accountable, there is a 
growing accumulation of economic rights that constitutes a form of economic citizenship. 
This new citizenship does not belong to the people – it belongs to firms and market. Since 
China pursued economic liberalization in 1978, China encouraged privatization of assets 
previously held in common. China also created a social system where capitalist enterprises 
can both form and function freely. It eviscerated social protections, and shattered the “iron 
rice bowl” (Harvey, 2005). While China avoided the “shock therapy” recipe for economic 
development imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, China 
embraced a new form of neoliberalism that allowed Communist Party elites to claim the 
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ownership of massive corporate profit, while leaving social protections in austerity (Pun, 
2005).  
Economic globalization has occurred unevenly across the world. One of the major 
consequences of this new economic citizenship is the burgeoning demand for a large, easily 
exploited, and relatively powerless labor force across the globe. Workers in the developing 
world often find it necessary to migrate both internally and internationally to fulfill the 
growing demand of jobs.  
B. Push-Pull Factors in China 
In China, growing migration is propelled both by the early stages of economic 
globalization, and a state-led effort to relax the domestic labor market. The Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), in the Pearl River Delta region north of Hong Kong, was 
opened to Western and Asian capital investments in 1980 under Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership. Local officials provided overseas investors with a wide array of preferential 
policies including tax exemptions, cheap land, and streamlined procedures for export (Pun & 
Chan, 386). Employers also pushed the state for access to cheap, flexible, and unskilled 
labor to fulfill these factory jobs.  
While the growing economic opportunities are concentrated in the cities, the quality of 
village life has declined. After the founding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) introduced hukou to exploit the rural population in 
much the way of their Russian counterparts, siphoning resources out of agriculture to invest 
in heavy industries and subsidize the urban population’s living standards (Jacka, Kipnis, 
Sargeson, 2013). Between 1978 and 1984, following the introduction of the family 
responsibility system in the agricultural sector, rural incomes rose by the exceptionally high 
rate of 14.2% per year, before slowing to just over 1.9% in the second half of the 1980s 
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because of the obstacles to the reforms after 1986. During the period of the setback to the 
reforms from 1989 to 1991, the growth in rural incomes stagnated at 0.6%, and 1989 even 
showed a decline of 7.4% in relation to the previous year (Yang, 2006). Throughout reform 
period, the coastal region has enjoyed the highest income, as depicted on Figure 3, while 
rural-urban disparities grew (Yang, 2006). 
Figure 3: Regional average income.  
 
Wang (223) used survey data to show from 1991 to 2004, the urban-rural household 
income gap enlarged to more than three to one. State priorities heavily favor urban and 
industrial development over agriculture. Whyte (18) documented that most of the 
government-directed bank loans go to large state-owned enterprises, rather than private 
business and farm investment. Moreover, villages and townships are forced to take on public 
work projects while receiving little state funding, to pursue those ambitious mandates, local 
governments levied a large amount of taxes and fees on its residents. Shortage of arable 
land, lack of local employment opportunities, and falling prices for agricultural products, not 
to mention the ineffective or even corrupted village cadres, pushed rural people out of their 
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village. For women, specifically, a desire to see the world, now made more visible through 
television and increased flows of people across areas, and a wish to improve their material 
life, in addition to, in some cases, the need to escape oppression or familial conflict, further 
propelled rural people toward towns and cities (Jacka, 2005). 
Demand for labor in the city combined with poor living conditions in the countryside 
formed the push-pull factors for a perfect mass migration climate in China. As a result, the 
influx of migrants dramatically shifted the demography of cities. A report released in 2014 
shows Shanghai took the lead in absorbing 9.5 million migrants in their city of 24 million 
residents, Beijing took in 7.7 million migrants in the city of 21 million residents, followed 
by Shenzhen, which has 7.5 million migrants out of 10 million residents (value line).  
Migrant workers in urban China possess unique characteristics. A survey conducted by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (2013) found that, 64.8 percent of all rural migrant workers 
were to be found in China’s eastern region, including the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong 
and the Yangzi River Delta near Shanghai. The majority of migrant workers worked in 
manufacturing, construction, services, and retail. The average migrant is just over 21 years 
old, and most of them only received education up to middle school. Their median monthly 
income is 2,609 yuan, or about $417; within that, migrant workers send nearly half of their 
earnings home, at roughly 1,067 yuan, or at $171 per month. Even though rural migrant 
workers now spend more money in the city they work and live, they still carry on the 
cultural tradition of caring for family members who remain at home. 
C. Hukou Reform 
From the state’s point of view, the consequences of market reform have undermined the 
effectiveness of hukou. On the one hand, cheap rural migrant laborers were wanted to 
support the economic growth, but on the other, urban officials and citizens expressed grave 
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concerns with these uncouth “intruders” (Solinger, 1999). Migrant enclaves in the city are 
deemed as dirty, messy, and chaotic. 
Some early hukou reforms aim to blur the rural-urban divide. Nevertheless, these 
reforms continue to perpetuate social and economic stratification. In the late 1990s, hukou 
became increasingly localized as cities experimented with “blue stamp hukou,” which 
offered transitional local status to affluent migrants who are buying apartments in the city. In 
reality, this measure benefitted very few migrants, because the price tag was so high, that 
among Beijing’s 2.37 million temporary hukou holders in 1999, only 715 families acquired 
local urban hukou through housing purchases (Wang, 2010). From 2008-2010, similar 
“investment for hukou” schemes were introduced in various cities, but for the vast majority 
of poorer migrant parents who hold unstable jobs, and have to send most of the earnings 
back home, getting an urban hukou or even a temporary working permit in big cities become 
simply impossible.  
To circumvent the limited hukou reform, the government announced a sweeping plan in 
2014 to incorporate more farmers into small- to medium-sized cities (Johnson, 2014). This 
would encourage more migrants to first work in a larger urban city far away from home, 
make as much money as they can, as quickly as possible, then use their savings to buy an 
apartment in a smaller sized township that is much closer to home, so they can settle “under 
one roof” with their families. This proves to be an effective campaign so far, as many of my 
interviewees have expressed that they plan to settle in a smaller township near their home 
village after a few more years of hard laboring in Beijing.  
Many scholars on China focus on the hukou as the primary barrier to explain the 
struggles migrant workers face in the cities. Some research has shown that migrant parents 
decide to leave their children behind because they lack urban hukou, and as a result, their 
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children are unable to complete the nine-year compulsory education in the city. Existing 
literature has also emphasized on the feminization of migration in post-reform China. The 
next section will attempt to summarize this literature, and explain why additional research is 
needed in order to better understand migration and its consequences on Chinese migrant 
parents and their children. 
D. On Hukou as Preventing the Reunification of Migrant Families 
Much literature points to hukou as the primary divide between residents in cities and the 
countryside. Even though rural migrant workers can physically leave their home village, 
their rural hukou prevents them from escaping the unequal social structure. Studies of 
migrants who hold rural hukou in urban China have consistently portrayed a picture of 
migrant laborers working in a segmented labor market, earning less pay and fewer benefits 
compared with urban residents, and living in substandard housing with little social 
protection. Since migrant workers cannot afford to buy an apartment in the city, and their 
housing arrangement is not backed by their work unit (danwei), migrant workers are 
vulnerable to predatory renting, and they have very littler resources in the fight against 
abusive landlords. In addition, the separation or segregation extends far beyond work and 
income and well into health, social networks, children’s education, and, ultimately, 
citizenship rights (Hunnum, Wang, Adams, 2008; Yip, 2010: 152; Wu, 2010: 74).  
Migrant workers’ unfair treatment in the city force them to overwork and receive 
underpay. According to a survey done by the Center for Child Rights – Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Beijing, 53 percent of migrant parents decide to leave their children behind 
because they are struggling to cover the basic cost of living in their new working 
environment, while 68 percent of the parents expressed concerns over long working hours, 
which lead to the lack of time to look after their own children if they were brought along to 
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the city (Kardaszewicz, 2013). As a result, the number of “left-behind children” (liushou 
ertong) has also increased dramatically. Chan (2007) reports that there were about 58 
million children below 18 years of age left behind by parents in the countryside. Out of that, 
52 percent of the children are living with relatives other than their parents, while more than 
70 percent of the children left behind are under age 14. Since the report was published, the 
total number of left-behind children has also grown to 61 million in 2014.  
When it comes to family separation, much research has also associated hukou with the 
decision to leave children behind. The Center for Child Rights and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (2014) conducted surveys and found out three main reasons for migrant 
parents being unable to live with their children in cities where they worked are insufficient 
time, high living cost, and hukou restrictions. Because the education budget for the nine-year 
compulsory education in China is allocated through local governments and is not 
transferable, urban schools with a limited education budget are reluctant to accept rural 
migrant children unless their parents compensate for the additional cost. Since many of rural 
migrant parents cannot afford to pay the extra fees, they often leave their children behind to 
attend schools in local village or the township. Kong and Meng (2010) find that children of 
migrants, either left behind or in cities, are less likely to have good education and health 
outcomes compared with rural non-migrant children and urban children. Other research has 
focused on migrant parents’ decision to return given the hukou barrier cannot be overcome. 
Démurger and Xu (2011) analyzed archival data to show that women and migrant families 
with school-age children, especially sons, are more likely to return.  
Although many research focuses on various hukou reforms, they do not explore a couple 
of important question. Is it possible for migrant parents to employ strategic methods other 
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than obtaining an urban hukou in order to reunite with their children? What other strategies 
do migrant parents use to raise their children either from afar or close by?  
E. On the Feminization of Migration  
Existing scholarship on Chinese migrant women often focus on the voices of young, 
childless, single women. In Ngai Pun’s (2005) ethnographic experience as a factory girl, or 
dagongmei in Shenzhen, she documents how women dagongmei resist the triple oppression 
forced upon them from the state, capital, and the local employer. Pun reports that dagongmei 
use a cartography of transgressing resistant behaviors such as dream, scream, fainting, 
menstrual pain, inner splitting of self, workplace defiance, slowdowns, fighting, running 
away, even petition and strike as a form of rightful resistance that focus on more minor and 
multisited journey of a dagongmei.  
Migrant women are fetishized as easy to manage and quick to exploit because of their 
docile, disciplined, and productive traits. Jacka (2005) conducted fieldwork in Beijing and 
reports that the marginality and discrimination migrant women suffer are compounded by 
their inferior gender status. Migrant women not only make less than urbanites, they also 
make less than migrant men, and they are subject to invasive regulation and surveillance of 
their reproductive activities, and sexual harassment and violence, as well as to the other 
forms of regulation and violence suffered by migrant men. 
Scholarly research on married migrant women has been scantly focused on their inability 
to venture out their enclaves. Jacka’s fieldwork (2005) shows that married migrant women 
join their husbands in the city out of sense of duty to unite, and to keep an eye on their 
husbands’ behaviors. Jacka’s fieldwork also revealed that migrant married women are 
vulnerable to domestic abuse. Unlike single migrant girls, married women live in enclaves, 
and generally do not associate with local Beijingers.  
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Although existing scholarship on feminization of migration focuses on the agencies of 
migrant women, few scholars have examined how migrant children are raised, particularly, 
on the differences between poor and not-so-poor migrant families. To do so we must build 
on existing literature, and explore how migrant workers’ experience shaped their decision of 
parenting, and how their children internalize their childhood experiences. This study focuses 
on the central question of whether migrant parents living in Beijing without the urban hukou 
have explored alternative parenting resources, and how that affects their relationship with 
their children. 
F: On Family and Children 
Prior studies have focused on how hukou barrier and economic exploitation impact the 
everyday experiences of parenting. However, they do not explore how different social-
economic statuses affect migrants’ ability to care for their children. Drawing on interview 
and fieldwork with more than 140 members of Mexican families in both New Jersey and 
south-central Mexico, Dreby (2010) finds that although the U.S. legal system makes it 
extremely difficult for parents to devise plans for reuniting their family, parents do make 
considerable amount of effort to reunite with their left behind children. On average, mothers 
spend less time away from their children than do fathers. Parents also actively try to keep up 
with the changes in their children’s lives, and use phone calls, gifts, and remittances to 
manage separation.  
Even though the deciding factor for Mexican parents to return home is determined by 
their documentation status, whereas cost, time, and hukou are the primary factors that limit 
Chinese migrant parents from permanent reunification with their children, both set of 
families wrestle with similar consequences of leaving their children behind. Since hukou 
prevents rural migrant children from utilizing public resources in urban areas, in many ways, 
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the ramifications of the hukou system resemble the difficulties undocumented immigrants 
face in the U.S. Even though migrant parents in China do not face fears of deportation, they 
lack equal status, protection, and much of their struggles remain invisible to policymakers 
and urbanites. Seeing how Mexican parents in America care for their children is not only a 
good case study for scholars who are interested on China, it also offers Chinese 
policymakers an insight to the broader problems migrant families face worldwide.   
Although a small amount of literature does focus on left behind children, most analysis 
has emphasized on how gender construction affects children’s experience and their 
interpretation of migration. Parreñas’ fieldwork in the Philippines (2005) finds that as a 
result of enforced gender ideology, children who grew up in transnational families are more 
likely to accept their migrant fathers’ absence, while migrant mothers do not receive the 
same understanding. When asked, many children believe mothers move more for 
themselves, and fathers more for the family (Parreñas, 2005: 64). Gender construction 
influences the ways children understand the migration of their parents, which in turn shape 
their relationships with their parents. Moreover, the gender division of labor is not changed 
even when mothers break through traditional gender roles and go on to become the 
breadwinner in the family. For example, most children with migrant mothers describe their 
fathers as “physically present, but emotionally absent” (Parreñas, 2005: 99). Parreñas points 
out that while men reject nurturing the family from up close, migrant women struggle to 
nurture their children from a distance. This study suggests that gender construction not only 
affects the relationship between parents and children, it also can further damage the life 
chances of children who are left behind. Further research is needed to examine how these 
parenting decisions and gender-based responsibilities can potentially affect left-behind 
children, particularly daughters’ decision, to form a family once they enter adulthood.  
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G: Towards a Working Hypothesis This	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  gender	  and	  migration	  in	  comparing	  how	  poor	  and	  not-­‐so-­‐poor	  migrant	  parents	  without	  urban	  hukou	  care	  for	  their	  left	  behind	  children,	  and	  how	  that	  experience	  affects	  children’s	  outlook	  on	  life,	  work,	  and	  future	  parenting.	  This	  study	  challenges	  the	  prior	  studies	  that	  have	  used	  the	  
hukou	  as	  a	  primary	  measure	  of	  inequality,	  and	  challenges	  the	  notion	  that	  migrant	  mothers	  are	  merely	  passive	  victims	  of	  discrimination.	  Rather	  I	  will	  show,	  these	  women	  have	  agency:	  their	  migration	  may	  include	  the	  decision	  to	  escape	  an	  unhappy	  marriage,	  or	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  more	  money	  for	  the	  family.	  This	  study	  also	  suggests	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  migrant	  family’s	  social-­‐economic	  statuses,	  many	  wealthy	  migrant	  parents	  buy	  into	  the	  culture	  of	  consumption	  and	  materialism;	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  economic	  success	  to	  justify	  their	  time	  of	  absence.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  explain	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  study	  and	  the	  results	  in	  greater	  detail.
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III. Research Design and Methodology 
Figure 4: Migrant workers waiting to catch the Beijing subway. Source: English.Caixin.com 
 
A. Migrant Population: Selection of Respondents 
Beijing is the capital of China, and the second largest city by urban population of over 
11 million residents, after Shanghai – China’s most populous city – which carries a 
population of over 22 million (World Population Review, 2015). Beijing controls the 
nation's political artery, cultural dissemination, and it is the hub for some of the most 
prestigious universities in the county. Beijing is an ideal place to study migrant families, not 
only because it is the second largest city in absorbing migrant workers nationwide, but also 
because it is the political center where most policies on migration are made.  
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This study examines the target population of migrant parents who are working in Beijing 
without a Beijing hukou, and have left their children behind or have reunited with them after 
an extended period of separation. The target population is separated into two groups by their 
income level to those who make less than 5,793 yuan (about $927) and those who make 
more than 5,793 yuan per month. Since 5,793 yuan was the 2014 average income for 
residents in Beijing (Liu, 2014), this number was chosen to represent the cut off line 
between Beijing’s poor and not-so-poor migrant parents. However, given the average 
income is for Beijing residents, this real monthly average income could very well be lower 
for migrant parents in Beijing, since most migrants do not have Beijing hukou. Thus readers 
should take into considerations that most migrant parents in Beijing make less than 5,793 
yuan, but they are expected to pay for the cost of living calculated base on what an average 
Beijing resident makes.      
These criteria are helpful to study the experience of migrant parents and their children 
because most migrant parents without Beijing hukou cannot easily bring their children along 
and send them to local schools, living under the shadow as illegal residents poses particular 
challenges to migrant families in caring for their children, both from present and afar. 
Moreover, by looking at migrant parents across the income level spectrum, this study will 
highlight the particular challenges faced by migrant parents from different income levels. 
I conducted fieldwork in Beijing from September to December 2014. Migrant parents 
are easy to identify as they tend to be older, and one of the common conversation topics in 
China is on one’s family. Migrant parents are fairly easy to communicate with because they 
have few relatives near by, and they long for an outlet to “speak their bitterness” to someone 
who is interested in their stories. Speaking bitterness was a campaign first initiated by the 
Chinese Communist Party, in which Party officials mobilized farmers to speak in anti-
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landlord trials denouncing exploitation and injustice. At speak bitterness sessions, witnesses 
were encouraged to expose past sufferings (ku) – and many did so in an emotional and 
dramatic fashion (Schwarcz, 1996). During my interviews, several migrant parents used the 
phrase “speaking bitterness”, and lamented that no one cared to listen. When the Chinese 
Communist Party choreographed “speaking bitterness” during Maoist era, the Party aimed to 
bring justice to farmers against the economic exploitation by capitalistic landlords. Today as 
the Party reshapes its policies to favor economic growth, economic exploitation and injustice 
are downplayed. Lisa Rofel (1994) documented that Hangzhou silk workers used speaking 
bitterness in a nostalgic register. Workers feel nostalgic about the past because the state no 
longer listens and supports farmers’ and migrant workers’ rights – the very same population 
that was the backbone to the success of the Communist revolution. By speaking bitterness, 
workers are talking back to the government who once protected them but now oppresses 
them.  
I met with some of the migrant parents several times to get follow up on the 
development of family crisis they are facing. In sum, I conducted 20 semi-structured 
interviews with migrant parents and some of their adult children from a wide range of 
income backgrounds in Beijing. Since most of the poor migrant parents left their children 
home, I did not have the opportunity to meet and speak with the children themselves. 
Instead, most of my interactions with the adult children are those from not-so-poor migrant 
families, whose children lived with them in Beijing.  
Though I did not interview poor migrant children, I was able to document, through 
participant observation, the resilient and optimistic attitudes of migrant elementary students 
in Beijing. During my time in Beijing, I also held an internship at the Migrant Children’s 
Foundation, The Foundation was founded in 2009, by a dedicated British educator, who 
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became involved with migrant children’s advocacy through a Rotary Club meeting. Since 
then, this non-governmental organization has been working with migrant communities in 
Beijing, offering volunteer teaching placements at under-resourced migrant schools. During 
the three months, I was a student mentor teaching English and Math to Beijing’s migrant 
children. From the experience, I learned that behind the school’s overcrowding and under-
equipped classrooms, migrant children’s schools in Beijing operate on a tight budget, and 
have difficult times to attract and retain good teachers. Despite these obstacles, migrant 
children’s enthusiasm and ability to learn were not dampened one bit. They are smart, 
disciplined, and eager to participate. If policymakers can make more investment into 
China’s migrant children, so much more talents can be cultivated to power China’s next 
generation.  
In structuring the interviews, I divided our conversations into three parts. First, I aim to 
gather the basic demographic information about each respondent, such as age, gender, 
educational level, number of children they have, and the years they have separated from 
their children. Second, I asked how do they care for their children, the obstacles they face, 
and how do they try to overcome them. Third, I asked how do they perceive migration 
affected their family relations, what are some of the concerns they have for their children’s 
future?  
In formulating these questions, I try to cover several major discussion points. For 
migrant parents with left behind children, the questions are focused on:  
• What	  made	  them	  move	  to	  Beijing?	  What	  do	  they	  do?	  	  
• Who	  is	  caring	  for	  their	  children	  while	  they	  are	  away?	  	  
• Are	  caretakers	  supportive	  of	  their	  decision	  to	  move?	  	  
• Is	  it	  difficult	  to	  communicate	  with	  their	  children	  from	  afar?	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• How	  do	  they	  exercise	  parent	  supervision	  from	  a	  distance?	  	  
• What	  kind	  of	  troubles	  their	  children	  are	  facing,	  and	  how	  are	  migrant	  parents	  helping	  to	  resolve	  them?	  	  
• What	  are	  migrant	  parents’	  plans	  or	  end-­‐goals	  after	  working	  in	  Beijing?	  	  For	  migrant	  parents	  whose	  children	  are	  in	  Beijing,	  I	  asked:	  
• How	  many	  years	  were	  they	  apart	  before	  reuniting?	  	  
• How	  are	  their	  children	  doing	  in	  school?	  	  
• Was	  it	  difficult	  to	  reconnect	  at	  first	  after	  many	  years	  of	  separation?	  	  
• How	  is	  their	  relationship	  now	  with	  their	  children?	  Were	  they	  appreciated?	  	  
• What	  are	  some	  of	  their	  hopes	  for	  their	  children?	  	  
For now-adult children, my questions were revolved around:  
• How	  did	  they	  cope	  with	  being	  away	  from	  and	  reunite	  with	  their	  parents?	  	  
• Do	  they	  feel	  understood	  by	  their	  parents?	  	  
• Where	  do	  they	  see	  themselves	  after	  graduation	  or	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years?	  	  
• Do	  they	  want	  to	  be	  a	  migrant	  worker,	  perhaps	  more	  skilled?	  	  
• How	  do	  they	  plan	  to	  raise	  their	  children	  someday?	  
B. Data Collection Methodologies 
The findings of this study come from 20 informal interviews, and these interviews aim to 
answer how do migrant parents care for their children, what challenges they face, and how 
do they overcome them. Some of my interviewees are housekeepers and nannies who work 
for friends of my relatives. At children’s playground where my niece played, I would sit in 
the nannies’ circle, and chat up with nannies from all walks of life. One not-so-poor migrant 
parent was introduced by my extended relatives, through whom I met a couple of more not-
  27 
so-poor migrant parents who were in similar social circles. A couple of my interviews come 
from hour-long conversations with migrant parents whom I met on subways, which I then 
followed up with phone calls. Yet other interviews were conducted by initiating 
conversations at local Beijing shop owners’ migrant enclaves.  
Such data collection methods obviously do not provide a representative view of migrant 
parents in Beijing. Since some migrant parents might currently be unemployed, by only 
talking to working migrant parents, my conversations might paint a rosier picture of migrant 
lives than the majority actually experience.     
In approaching my interviewees, I explained to them the purpose of my study, and told 
them that I would write notes based on our conversation after it had been completed. (I took 
no notes during the conversation, since I felt that would interrupt the flow and discourage an 
open interaction.) I also assured them that they would have complete anonymity. Some of 
the migrant parents I approached were suspicious of my intent, and did not want to be 
interviewed, but they asked many questions about my academic background. A couple of 
times during my conversation with street vendors, “street management representatives” – 
community-based vigilantes whose job is to keep an eye out for street disorders – came by 
and questioned me about where I came from, why do I pursue this study, and what I hope to 
achieve. In many ways these questions resemble the inquires of my graduate committee 
during the development of my thesis, but in the case of community vigilantes, they were 
there to makes sure that I was not going to stir up any troubles, and my interviewees were 
not going to bad-mouth or blame their misfortunes on the government.  
I used semi-structure interviews instead of surveys for two reasons. First, I am interested 
in studying the lived experience of migrant parents, and want to construct narratives of their 
lives that otherwise could be missed in surveys or questionnaires. In-depth conversations 
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show that migrant parents are not merely passive recipients, they use the discourse of 
“speaking bitterness” to talk back to the regime that once protected farmers, but now favors 
urban growth that was built on the back of migrant workers. Even though I only have 20 
interviews to work with, which is far off from being representative of migrant parents in 
Beijing, these 20 interviews give scholars and policymakers a reason to further examine the 
effects of migration on family and children through reading about their hope and struggles. 
Second, since family relations are fairly sensitive topics, I did not want to approach my 
target population with formalities that would characterize them as merely “study subjects.” 
Instead, I want to have candid conversations and wrote down the full transcript immediately 
afterwards. The challenge of recollecting from memory after conversation is my inability to 
record all of each conversation into my notebook. It would be impossible to record each 
sentence from my interviewee, thus many original quotes would be lost, and I can only work 
with what I remembered to record on the paper.  
To qualitatively analyze the informal interviews, I first translated our conversations from 
Mandarin to English, then inputted their basic demographic information into an Excel sheet, 
and grouped them by income levels and general themes.  
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IV. Findings and Discussion 
Figure 5: Migrant fruit shop vendor in a typical Beijing street market. Source: Qiao Li, 2014 
 
 
I organize this chapter with the subtitle of my three questions. For each question, I start 
with “Data Discussion” to compare and characterize my overall findings, followed by brief 
sections on the stories of poor and not-so-poor migrant parents and their children. In the first 
two sections, the stories of poor migrant parents are represented by the experience of Auntie 
Li, and the not-so-poor migrant parents are represented by the stories of Mr. Chu and Ms. 
Chen. The third question was partially answered by the now-adult children of no-so-poor 
migrant parents, partially responded through the stories of poor migrant parents, and through 
my participant observation while volunteering for the Migrant Children’s Foundation. 
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A. Who Are the Migrant Parents? 
1. Data Discussion: 
The average age of migrant parents I interviewed are in their mid-forties, as shown in 
Figure 1. There are only two migrant parents over age 60, and only one under age 30; half of 
all interviewees are between ages 40-49. On average, a migrant parent spends 9 years in 
Beijing; however, eight migrant parents have been in Beijing 10 years and above. In terms 
of number of children they have, aside from three cases who have 3 children, all other 
migrant parents have 1-2 children, which would satisfy the limit of “one-child policy” and 
its “plus-one extension” for village farmers. 
 
Figure 6: Age, years in Beijing, and number of children of migrant parents interviewed. 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Age 29 70 ~44 
Years in Beijing 1 24 ~8 
Number of Children 1 3 1.5 
 
The interview also finds that despite the long years away from home, 75% or migrant 
parents remain married to their first spouse, see Figure 2. 15% have remarried, interestingly 
enough, two out of three remarried migrant mothers left their home to escape an unhappy, 
abusive marriage. Only two migrant parents are divorced, and they remain single fathers for 
over 5 years raising their children in Beijing.  
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Even though it is very difficult to leave family and children behind, millions of migrant 
parents in China consider migration as a strategy to provide for the family, because the 
traditional understanding of a Chinese family, or jia, allows individuals to relate to each 
other by blood or marriage more so than physical proximity. Woon (1991) conducted three 
years of fieldwork in Kaiping, and found that even though family members may live in 
different households, or even in separate places, their budgets, properties, and interests are 
interconnected. 
Moreover, migrant parents commonly utilize split-household strategies to divide 
responsibilities and work together to maintain their family structure (Wang, 2010: 102). 
That is, the mother and father in the family would rotate their time to work in a different 
place, while leaving their children back home under the care of the other spouse and 
relatives. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of migrant parents and their children’s marital status. 
Marital Status Percentage 
Married 70% 
Remarried 15% 
Divorced 10% 
Single (now-adult child) 5% 
 
Like the reason that propelled Auntie Li to work in Beijing, more than half of migrant 
parents in the interviews also left home to escape poverty. Poverty comes in different shapes 
and forms, and the roots of many are gender-based. One migrant mother, Ms. Wang, came 
to Beijing after her husband had gambled and lost 50,000 yuan (about $8,054) in the hope to 
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pay for their debt; as a result, now in addition to their original debt, she had to work to pay 
for his gambling losses, plus interest. The two migrant mothers – Ms. Liu and Ms. Duan – 
who left because of unhappy marriage, reported that because their husband was the primary 
breadwinner in the family, when they found out that their husband was cheating on them 
repeatedly, which subsequently led to both divorces, they received no financial help. As a 
result, both mothers had to find other means to provide for their children. They also felt 
humiliated and did not want to remain in the village to become the talk of the town. When 
men commit infidelity, women are left to take the punishment. 
Three out of twenty migrant parents moved because of work relocation. These parents 
were marginally better off financially than those who moved to escape poverty. Currently, 
all of their children have reunited with them after an initial period of separation.  
In China, the pressure for the groom’s family to provide housing support for the newly 
wed is deeply rooted in the tradition, along with financial support, parents often had the 
power to pick spouses for their sons. In new China, parents are still expected to provide 
housing for their son, but now their children have the right to choose their own spouse, and 
their children are demanding separate and private apartment to form a nuclear family. 
Traditionally, Anthropologists have described that the dominant Chinese family as 
patrilineal and patrilocal, meaning that descent is traced through the male line, and when 
women marry, they leave their natal family to join their husband’s father’s home (Jacka, 
Kipnis, and Sargeson, 2013). Even though women now have more opportunities to be 
financially independent, the Chinese tradition for an ideal marriage, as expressed by one of 
the interviewees, is a marriage where the groom’s family can provide an apartment, and the 
bride’s family can buy a car.  
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As the interviews indicated, four out of twenty migrant parents moved to Beijing from 
the nearby province Hebei just to save up some extra cash for their son’s future apartment. 
When I asked, “you son has a job, isn’t his responsibility to chart his own future?” two of 
the mothers told me on different occasions, “no one will marry your son if you don’t provide 
an apartment.” One mother, Ms. Ji, complained about her son’s girlfriend, “she works in a 
different city, and she is very short. My son is an engineer graduated from a top university; 
he makes a good earning. He deserves better.” Ms. Ji’s complaint shows that even though as 
a parent, she is expected to contribute to her son’s wedding cost, she is frustrated by her 
eroding influence as a matchmaker for her son. Migrant parents in China find themselves in 
situations where they must continue to work after retirement, even when their son has 
entered the workplace, to save money for a pricey marriage.  At the same time, parents are 
struggling to cope with the changing characteristics of traditional family structure. In the 
process, they are losing out on building a lasting emotional connection with their children.  
 
Figure 8: Percentage of migrant parents and their children’s reason behind moving to Beijing interviewed.  
Reasons Moving to Beijing Percentage 
Escaping Poverty 50% 
Escaping Unhappy Marriage 10% 
Work relocation/business opportunities 10% 
Saving money for son’s marriage 20% 
Joining their parents 10% 
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2. Faces of Poor Migrant Parents: 
While the experiences of migrant parents are varied, there are some experiences are 
common to most of them. One of my interviews, with Auntie Li, seems to encapsulate the 
experience of all migrant workers. I will start with a brief anecdote from Auntie Li, and I 
will return to her periodically throughout. 
Auntie Li 
Originally from Henan Province, Ms. Li, commonly referred to as Auntie Li by her 
employer, is one of thousands of nannies and housekeepers who live and work in Beijing. 
Like many domestic workers in the city, Li lives with her employer, and works 14 hours a 
day, 6 days a week, while making 4,000 yuan (about $650) a month. On an average 
workday, her day starts at 7am when she gets up to prepare breakfast for the family, she then 
takes the 3-year-old baby to preschool, cleans the apartment, cooks dinner, and end the day 
after she tucks the baby in for bed by 9 or 10pm. 
Auntie Li has 3 children at home. When she left home to work in Beijing 8 years ago, 
her youngest son was only 2 years old. When she went home after the first year of being 
away, her youngest son did not recognize her and refuse to call her mother. “Life is hard for 
farmers in the village,” she said, as she wept her tears with dry, chapped hand. In the past 
summer, her village suffered a draught, for 2 months there was not a single drop of rain. As 
a result, most of their beans died. In years like this, Auntie Li said, “I have no choice but to 
come out and work.” Even though her husband remains at home, their children did not grow 
up with him because he has to work in the field all day. The three children grew up with 
their paternal grandparents, and when they are a little older, Auntie Li says, “my husband 
also plans to come out to work as a construction worker.”  
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When I asked Auntie Li how did she cope with exceeding the birth limit, which is 2, for 
rural hukou holders, Auntie Li spoke of pride and happiness as she shared her extraordinary 
story. Back in 2002, when she found out she was pregnant with her third child, she knew 
that her sterilization procedure two week earlier had failed. Her husband just left to work in 
Xinjiang province, which is over 1,880 miles away. To avoid the hefty fine, she decided to 
have an abortion. After a couple of months, she felt something was moving inside of her. 
The doctor confirmed that the procedure worked, but she did not realize she had twins! 
Initially, she was worried that the abortion procedure left some permanent disability on the 
other fetus, but after numerous hospital visits and 5 CAT scans, she was confident the baby 
was alive and healthy. When Li was ready to give birth, her local hospital closed down 
because of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic, an atypical pneumonia that 
had infected thousands in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Li had to take a 4-hour bus ride 
to a hospital in the neighboring county, and had to pay 10,000 yuan (about $1,605) in fine to 
purchase a hukou for her third born. Auntie Li said during those years her husband was not 
home, she had to care for the children, work on the farm, and help her in-laws with 
housework. When her son turned 3, her husband came home from Xinjiang, their meager 
earnings from farming became impossible to feed their family, and that was when Auntie Li 
decided to go work in Beijing.  
3. Faces of Not-so-poor Migrant Parents: 
Mr. Chu came to Beijing fourteen years ago from Hubei Province. He was the youngest 
in the family, and did not finish high school. When Mr. Chu was a child, he said he has 
never dreamed of escaping poverty from his village. They grew up as farmers, and were 
very isolated from city life.   
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When Mr. Chu left the village, he was a father of three, with his youngest son being only 
two years old. Legally, Mr. Chu was only able to have two children because of his rural 
hukou status (a plus-one exemption to the one-child policy if the first-born is a girl), but his 
first two born are both girls, and they wanted another chance for a boy. Mr. Chu did not 
specify how he bypassed the hukou restriction for his third son, it is possible that he paid a 
fine like Auntie Li did, it is also commonly practiced to hold off on the hukou registration 
for the third-born while the family makes and saves money for the fine until the child is 
ready for school. Mr. Chu was able to focus on work because the mother of their children, 
his then-wife, was home to care for the elderly and the young. That has alleviated much 
stress, and allowed him to focus on just making money for the family. 
Mr. Chu worked at different places as a menial labor when he first came to the city. 
After he saved up some money, he invested some in small business ventures, and was quite 
successful. After years of being apart, his then-wife joined him in Beijing with their 
children, only to find out that he has been unfaithful. Mr. Chu complained that his children 
now do not have a mother who can look after them, so I asked, “why did you get a divorce?” 
He chuckled, “in China, when men make money, they start to get restless with their wealth. 
Men make mistake, but the society also makes young girls to think it is okay to be attracted 
to older, wealthier men. That’s just the way how society works.” 
Mr. Chu is 42 years old, and he is now a busy and accomplished businessman living in 
Beijing’s business central district with his three children, who are now late teenagers. He 
complains that his children do not appreciate him, as he always has to leave them, often in 
the evening, to work extra hours. “I have to make money, and I’m making money for them,” 
Mr. Chu says. 
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B. How Do Migrant Parents Care for Their Children? 
Figure 9: Migrant students learning in classroom. Source: Qiao Li, 2014. 
 
1. Data Discussion: 
Poor migrant parents, especially mothers, who leave their children behind, face many 
obstacles in caring for their family from afar. From making money, to taking care of 
themselves, to keeping up with their children’s physical and emotional needs, poor migrant 
parents find themselves unable to juggle the mounting responsibilities with little to no 
support from their family.  Not-so-poor migrants, who can afford to send their children to 
better schools, can be less anxious about their children’s academic performance. Spousal 
support, as illustrated by the case of Ms. Chen, is also critical in building a strong family and 
fostering a healthy environment for children to grow. 
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Figure 9 shows that roughly half of the parents have reunited with their children in my 
interview, and most of these parents were able to do so only after they become financially 
stable in Beijing. All except one parent brought their children to Beijing after they have 
saved some money, or have bought hukou for their children from a nearby city, like Tianjin, 
so their children can participate in the high school exit exam without grade penalty. The not-
so-poor migrant parents, as illustrated in my findings, find ways to bypass the hukou 
restriction by either planning to send their children abroad for college, or buying an urban 
hukou, sometimes through illegal means, from a nearby large-sized city. Wang (2010:102) 
found that, a Beijing or Tianjin resident, for example, can get into college with a high school 
exit exam score significantly (a quarter or more) lower than a resident of nearby Shandong 
Province. 
Ms. Tian was one of the interviewees who obtained hukou for her son through illegal 
purchase. Ms. Tian brought her son to Beijing from Heilongjiang Province after five years 
of separation. Both her and her husband came to Beijing as migrant workers in the hope to 
provide a better livelihood for the family. Initially, they did not want to permanently settle in 
Beijing, but their son’s grandmother, who was looking after him, complained that the boy 
started to act rebellious after years of living without direct parental supervision. Without 
having a long-term plan, Ms. Tian and her husband decided to bring their son to Beijing. 
“Even though we had to bite our teeth to get by financially after our son came, I am glad we 
can raise him nearby, and prevented him from doing bad things.” After getting her son here, 
Ms. Tian sent him to a local technical college to learn coding. I asked her if he can go to 
college in Beijing, she said as a matter of fact, “yes, I spent 10,000 yuan (roughly $1,600) to 
buy a Tianjin Hukou for my son, so he does not have to score higher than his Beijing 
counterpart for the same university.” 
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Figure 10: Percentage of migrant children living/not living in Beijing with their parents. 
Children in Beijing? Percentage 
Yes 55% 
No 45% 
 
 
The one parent who brought her son to Beijing neither had any savings nor the money to 
buy an urban hukou did so out of sheer desperation. Ms. Liu came to Beijing from Shandong 
Province after her husband abandoned their family 11 years ago. Initially, Ms. Liu left her 
son in the care of her older brother’s family, but a year later when she came back to visit, her 
14-year-old son has already dropped out from school, and has been helping out his uncle’s 
family by working on the farm. “He says, ‘mama, this is uncle’s house, I can’t live and eat 
for free here.’” Ms. Liu continued, “he was very skinny when I saw him. He looks toasted 
from working in the sun all day, and his hands were cracked.” It broke a mother’s heart to 
see her son live in such harsh condition; Ms. Liu also blames herself for leaving him behind. 
“At that moment I decided,” Ms. Liu says, “I’d rather beg with my son on the street than 
leaving him behind.” 
Ms. Liu’s son never went back to school again, and he has been working in different 
factories alongside her ever since they left together. “I live for my son,” Ms. Liu says, “my 
biggest wish is for him to get married soon. I am working very hard to save money for him 
to buy an apartment someday, someday soon.” 
For migrant parents whose children are physically left behind, they often rely on phone 
calls and WeChat – a Chinese texting and messaging app – to keep daily contact. During one 
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of my follow up conversations with Ms. Wang, a migrant mother from the mountainous 
region of Shaanxi Province, I asked how are her children doing lately. She said her son’s 
teacher sent her a WeChat message informing her that her son skipped school, and was 
caught smoking with a few other teenagers. Ms. Wang confronted her son right away, to 
which he denied. Ms. Wang said her son is a good kid, but she is very concerned that he will 
be corrupted by friends with bad influences, and with both her and her husband out working, 
she worries that her son will not test into any high schools. “I might have to take a year off 
from work and go home to make sure he doesn’t slack off. It all depends on how much 
money we make this year.”  
Migrant parents also rely on remittances and gifts to bridge the emotional void with their 
children. Ms. Wang works as a nanny in Beijing caring for a three-year-old boy. She works 
from 7am to 10pm, six days a week, and makes 4,000 yuan (about $644.35) a month. Out of 
that, she sends 3,000 yuan (about $483.26) home for her children. I asked if the cost of 
living is high in her village, she said that because her village is situated in a remote 
mountainous region, the product selection range is poor, but the cost of living is very high. I 
asked how often she sees her husband, and if he is also sending money home, Ms. Wang 
cried, and said she has not seen her husband for a year, as he is working at a mining site in 
Inner Mongolia. Working in the coal mine is a lucrative job, but he paid a dangerous price. 
Just two weeks after her husband arrived at the mine, part of the mine collapsed, and her 
husband’s back was badly hit. He is now still recovering from the back injury while working 
at the same time. 
When Ms. Wang left her village, her younger daughter had just turned three. She has not 
seen them for two years, but she often sends them gifts to make up for the time she is away. 
She says, “We don’t make much money, but when I buy gifts for my children, I always give 
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them the best. I buy them brand name clothes to wear so they don’t lose face among their 
peers. Since we are not around, they cannot be looked down by others.” 
The not-so-poor migrants in the interview seemed to have taken this culture of 
materialism to a different level after they have reunited with their adult children, almost to 
the point that they ignore the importance of children’s ability to be self-reliant. One migrant 
father boasted, “I have two apartments in Beijing, when my son gets married, he will have 
one, and when I die, he will have both. The only problem is, he is lazy and does not want to 
work hard, or at all. He quit his job and now spends all day on his computer in his room. I 
stopped giving him monthly allowances to see how will he survive.”  
Migrant parents who have reunited with their teenage children tend to focus more on 
their children’s academic progress. Ms. Tian, who bought her son a Tianjin Hukou, says, “I 
don’t want my son to repeat the same work choices as I did. I want him to learn some real 
skills from a technical college, and go on to find a white-collar job. I am paying for his 
tutoring classes in computer engineering. My son shows me his work in a lump of coding, I 
hope I am not spending money in vain, but I do not understand a thing that he tells me.”  
Ms. Tang takes academic discipline into a new level. “My daughters have done very 
well for themselves. I always teach them to never be complacent with their life. I came from 
nothing. I grew up in a very poor family, but my father always stressed on the importance of 
learning. I never stopped learning, and I encourage my daughters do the same.”  
Ms. Tang grew up in the shadow of Chinese Cultural Revolution in late 1960s. Cultural 
Revolution started in China by Chairman Mao Zedong after he was convinced that the 
Chinese Communist Party has grown complacent and lost its revolutionary spirit, to fight the 
so-called corrupted “revisionist,” the Party waged a fierce and violent “anti-rightist 
campaign” against intellectuals, landlords, and others judged as favoring capitalistic growth 
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(Gao, 1987). Because Ms. Tang’s father owned a small business, her family was unfairly 
targeted and prosecuted by Chairman Mao’s red guards during Cultural Revolution. Albeit 
her “revisionist” family background label, Ms. Tang worked through the ranks, and recently 
retired as an executive from a state-owned enterprise. She came to Beijing over twenty years 
ago through work transfer, and left both of her daughters at home in Hebei Province under 
the care of their grandmother until she settled down in Beijing, and brought them over years 
after. Ms. Tang pushes her daughters to work hard, sometimes too much, she admits, “I 
know I’m getting old, and young people nowadays have their ways on work and life, but 
they cannot be lazy as long as I’m around.”   
Yet to many other migrant parents, emotional connection was difficult to rekindle for 
both the parents and the children when they first reunited. For Ms. Tian, the migrant mother 
who owns a mini-mart, said her son did not talk much after he was brought along to Beijing. 
He was much closer to his grandmother, who raised him. To cope with the change, Ms. Tian 
also brought her mother to Beijing. She said during the first few years, when her son began 
to warm up to her, he would tell her each detail about his school day, asked or unasked. 
Even though Ms. Tian was exhausted from her workday, she listened attentively, and was 
always interested to learn more. “That’s the only way (to bridge the communication gap),” 
Ms. Tian says, “the child has so much to say, and as a mother, I must listen.” 
2. How Do Poor Migrant Parents Care for Their Children? 
The story of Auntie Li continues: 
Eight years passed by like the blink of an eye. Auntie Li’s mother recently had a stroke, 
and was paralyzed from waist down. Auntie Li’s extended families often criticize her for not 
fulfilling filial piety to her mother, even though she sends money home every month, both 
for her children and her mother. Her sister-in-law once told her “what good do you do if you 
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only send money? We are the ones stuck here feeding and cleaning your mother.” A year 
ago, when Auntie Li went back to visit her mother during Chinese New Year, she overheard 
her teenage niece and nephew say, “why won’t grandmother die? She is full of problems in 
this house.” Tears ran down her cheeks as Auntie Li talks about her mother. “I cannot atone 
my sins for abandoning my mother, but I also have 3 children to feed.” 
I asked Auntie Li if she has plans to stop working in Beijing and go home permanently, 
she said “my village is very poor, we cannot feed our family with the farm anymore. I hope 
to work and buy an apartment someday for my son’s marriage.”  
I asked how are her children doing in school, she said “my oldest just turned 17, and she 
is not doing well in school; she wants to come out and work like me. I am worried about her 
safely if she goes to Southern China alone, and I would feel more comfortable if she joins 
me in Beijing.”  
“It is hard to be a mother away from home,” Auntie Li says. “Yesterday I called home to 
check on the children, none of them is interested in talking to me. My second daughter in 
particular, does not like me, and refuses to talk to me.” Auntie Li said that none of her 
children are emotionally close to her. Auntie Li feels like she missed out on most of her 
children’s childhood, she feels inadequate as a mother and daughter. She said to me, “Life is 
too hard. Next life, I do not want to be a human again.”  
3. How Do Not-so-poor Migrant Parents Care for Their Children? 
Ms. Chen is a senior sales executive, who has been working and living in Beijing for 
over eighteen years. She came to Beijing before she had her son, but due to work pressure, 
after she gave birth, she sent her son back to Hebei province under the care of her husband 
and his parents.  
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For most of her son’s childhood, Ms. Chen was only home a couple times a year to 
spend major holidays with the family. She sent money home every month, until she reunited 
with her son before he started high school. Ms. Chen’s husband also has to travel a lot for 
business, but according to Ms. Chen, he is a supportive husband and father who closely 
monitors their son’s academic progress. Ms. Chen’s son attends a private high school in 
Beijing, which cost upward 30,000 yuan (roughly $4,833) per year. The school prepares 
Chinese students to apply for international universities overseas, with a curriculum 
emphasizing not only on students’ academic achievement, but also extracurricular activities. 
Even though Ms. Chen’s job requires her to travel quite a bit, she tries to not miss her son’s 
basketball game when they are in season. 
In our follow up meetings, Ms. Chen was particularly curious about the college 
admission process in the U.S., Ms. Chen learned that American universities put much 
emphasis on personal statement, so she enrolled her son into a personal statement tutoring 
class that prepares him to write.  
When I asked Ms. Chen if she will miss her son when he goes off to college, Ms. Chen 
said, “my son has always been very independent since he was a child, I will definitely miss 
him, but universities in China are too competitive, and his personality does not fit well with 
the environment here. He is not good with memorization, I think he will grow and thrive 
going abroad for college.” 
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C. How Does Migration Affect Family Relationships and Children?  
Figure 11: Migrant father and son working together. Source: Qiao Li, 2014 
 
1. Data Discussion: 
Poor migrant parents, especially mothers, bear a tremendous guilt for leaving their 
children behind, and they feel very inadequate in coping with their children’ emotional 
needs. Even though technologies allow families to communicate remotely, poor migrant 
parents are constantly challenged by their inability to directly supervise their children’s life. 
As left behind children grow into adulthood, they are very likely to repeat their parent’s step 
and become migrant workers themselves.   
Fathers in my interview have consistently expressed that their responsibility as a parent 
is to provide for the family. Migrant fathers bear less emotional burden for leaving their 
children behind, and this is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture. Even before the 
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founding of the People’s Republic of China, the ideal for a man to leave private life behind 
for a greater public cause was highly encouraged. As praised in classical literature by 
Mencius, one of the most influential Confucius philosophers, Yu the Great (dayu) was 
regarded as a deity after he successfully tamed the floods in north China plain, even though 
Yu left his wife and son behind for thirteen years. During Yu’s time away, he passed by his 
house three times, but never once did he step into the house to visit his family.  
The founding of the PRC further compounded to the ideal that private lives matter less in 
pursuit of common goods. During Maoist China, the Communist Party attempted to remove 
the family from the center of Chinese life. Mao championed for families to live and work in 
communes, children were raised in daycare instead of being looked after by parents. During 
the Cultural Revolution, the Party encouraged children to report, fight against, and even 
punish their parents who were deemed as anti-revolutionary. Later in post-reform era, 
Chairman Deng Xiaoping famously said that “economic development is the only form of 
development” – a slogan that still rings in many parts of the country – to encourage able-
bodied men and women to work hard and make money, even if it means to leave their 
family behind.   
2. Stories of Poor Migrant Children: 
Although I was not able to follow migrant parents home to talk to their children, I 
observed and documented the school environment at the Migrant Children’s Foundation 
elementary school where I worked, where most children are from low-income migrant 
families without a Beijing hukou, an average class size is over sixty students. I taught two 
classes per day, one-hour per class, and a ten-minute recess in between. Most of the 
classrooms do not have much electronic equipment to work with. There is no computer 
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monitor, DVD player, or screen projector for presentation, and it made it quite difficult 
when I try to show them a picture, video, or song to illustrate learning materials.  
Despite these challenges, migrant students’ enthusiasms were not dampened one bit 
when it comes to learning English. Students politely greeted the teachers every time before 
class started, and they are eager to participate when questions are posed. Because the class 
size is too big, most times it is impossible to work with everyone individually, but the 
hardworking ethics shown by these migrant students serve as an inspiration to show if more 
resources are made available to them, what incredible wealth of talents China could harvest 
in this next generation.  
3. Stories of Not-so-poor Migrant Parents and Children: 
For not-so-poor migrant parents, their ability to provide financial support for their 
children eases the emotional burden of being apart. One of the fathers I interviewed 
complained about his son who lives with him but rarely speaks to him. I asked if he thinks 
this problem has anything to do with them living apart for years, the father said sternly, “no. 
I fulfilled my duty as a father by providing for him. I sent home money regularly, and sent 
him to a boarding school, but he did not value anything I did for him.”  
For left behind children, they have a different story growing up without their parents. “I 
used to hide my mother’s motorcycle keys and cry every time before she left,” Nina says, “I 
didn’t want her to leave without me.” Nina’s mother worked far from the city before coming 
to Beijing, leaving Nina under the care of her maternal grandmother. She said, “I grew up 
with my grandmother, and she is the only one I will remain filial to.” When I asked what she 
thinks about her mother, she said bluntly, “my mother is very selfish.” Nina grew up to be a 
rebellious teenager; she dropped out of middle school, and started to work at age 16. With 
hard work, family connections, and a charismatic skill to cultivate the art of networking – 
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guanxi – Nina founded her own online company that markets sport-fishing packages to 
wealthy clientele.  
Now Nina is married and has a son, she spoils her son like a little emperor. Without 
Beijing hukou, Nina plans to send her son to international a bi-lingual school that prepares 
students to study overseas, and do not require Beijing hukou to register. International 
schools in Beijing cost around 200,000 yuan (about $32,275) per year on average (Beijing 
City International School, 2015).  “I have to work very hard to make money for my son,” 
Nina says, “I will give my son everything I did not have as a child. I will not let him feel a 
bit of sadness.” Among the frequent gifts Nina buys for her son, she entertains him with an 
iPad when she goes to work, and he is quite addicted to the device. When Nina told me that 
her son recently had eye problems from using too much iPad, I asked her if she has 
considered to spend more time with him instead of work, she was a bit offended by the 
question, perhaps she took it as a criticism. She said in a lecturing tone, “a few years of 
separation can bring lifelong financial comfort for the family. I work hard to raise the social 
status platform for my son. Someday we will move to an even richer neighborhood, and he 
will grow up with friends in high places. To be successful, it is all about personal network 
(renmai).” 
The art of networking – or Guangxixue – as described by Mayfair Yang (1994), is a 
facet of Chinese life that uses gift giving, favors, and banquets to establish mutual interests. 
Once personal network is established between two people, each can ask favor of the other 
with the expectation that the debt incurred will be repaid in the future. Guanxi is built to 
foster interdependence, obligation, and indebtedness. In the case of Nina, she believes in 
making more valuable contacts for her son as a key to his successful future, and she is 
willing to work for it, even at the expense of their family time, or her son’s eyesight.  
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Ironically, Nina is repeating what her mother did when she was young. Even though her 
mother’s absence left her an unhappy childhood, she nonetheless follows the footsteps of her 
parent believing that the financial gain will justify the time lost with her child. 
For Weiwei, a 23-year-old college sophomore in Beijing, her mother’s departure when 
Weiwei was in sixth grade left different meanings in her life. “Initially, I was very angry at 
both of my parents. I didn’t understand why they are divorced, and why my mom had to 
leave us.” Weiwei had to learn how to cook and clean as she took care of her younger 
brother almost on her own. In her teens, Weiwei ran away from home to protest her broken 
family, but years later she realized that her action was juvenile, and it had caused lots of 
grief for the family. Weiwei now understands that her mom escaped an abusive marriage 
and worked very hard to support Weiwei and her brother. All of her tuition and living 
expenses are paid for by her mother, Weiwei said that would not have been possible if her 
mother did not leave for work. Weiwei is now very close to her mother, and she strives to be 
a woman just like her mom, hardworking and selfless. When I asked Weiwei if she 
considers having a family someday. She said marriage maybe, but children, she does not 
want to have them ever. “Children are too energy consuming. I already raised my younger 
brother. Now I want to spend time and energy on my study and career, because girls must 
work hard and be independent.”  
 Even though Weiwei and Nina have different visions for how to raise their own 
family, they both are deeply affected by the decisions made by their mother, and they tend to 
model their life, consciously or unconsciously, after their mother’s path. According to 
Margery Wolf (1972), because girls are traditionally marginalized in society, as they do not 
have the same rights as sons, girls have a different understanding of family than do boys. 
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Girls tend to associate family centering on her mother, forming a uterine family with her 
mother and her mother's children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  51 
V. Conclusion 
This thesis examines the effect of China’s internal migration on both migrant parents and 
their children, some of whom are left-behind and some have reunited after a period of 
separation. The results discuss how migrant parents take care of their children from afar and 
close by, what are the challenges they face, and how do they combat them. Moreover, the 
findings also discuss how do migration affect left-behind children, as well as their decisions 
on parenting.  
Instead of accepting their role as passive recipients of discrimination, migrant parents, 
mostly mothers in the interview, are capable of charting a new future for themselves and 
their children. Migrant parents use creative ways to care for their children from afar: they 
use phone calls and WeChat to build emotional bonding with their children, and rely on 
remittances and gifts to make up the time apart. At the very least, this study also policy 
makers to recognize that migrant families are not a weak and disenfranchised population, 
but a strong and creative workforce that supports China’s globalizing economy. 
However, even if they keep regular contacts with their left-behind children, migrant 
mothers across all income levels bear tremendous guilt for leaving their children behind. 
Although all of the migrant parents and children in the interview lack Beijing hukou, they 
come up with innovative solutions to bypass with this institutional barrier. For poor migrant 
parents, since they lack the skills or capital to find well-paid jobs or start their own business, 
they do simply do not make enough money to bring their children along. Many poor 
migrants use split-household strategy to work in Beijing alone for a few years, while leaving 
their children in the care of family relatives, in the hope to make some money and buy an 
apartment in smaller towns nearby their village. For that purpose, some migrant parents 
come to Beijing just to work and save money for their son’s wedding. For the not-so-poor 
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migrants, they either purchase a hukou from a different city that has comparable privilege as 
Beijing, or send their children straight to international schools to avoid the hukou restriction 
altogether. However, there are some migrant parents who brought their children along to 
Beijing, and do not have the money to raise them in Beijing. For those parents, they have no 
choice but to let their children work in low-skill factory jobs in order to make the ends meet. 
For poor migrant children, their sense of sharing family’s financial burden is strong. 
Some of them even volunteer to drop off from school to work alongside their parent when 
they have younger siblings. For the not-so-poor children, especially those who have reunited 
with their parent(s), some have very weak sense of financial responsibilities. Migrant 
daughters are particularly close to their mothers, and tend to follow the path of their 
mother’s even if it is unconsciously done. Regardless of migrant children’s wealth level, 
they have expressed that they felt emotionally left-behind, and sometimes that morph into a 
slight resentment, even after they reunite with their parents.  
A close examination on how migration affects family relationships offers insight into 
parents and children’s struggle to better their lives and achieve upward mobility. In 
achieving their goals, a common theme throughout my findings is that both poor and not-so-
poor migrant parents bought into the culture of materialism and consumption, which is 
promoted by the state. Migrant parents use remittances and gifts to cope with separation and 
justify their time apart from the family: poor migrant parents buy brand name clothes and 
gadgets for their children to keep them happy, while not-so-poor migrant parents work extra 
hours to build a higher social platform for them to thrive. In the process, it has caused 
trauma, family tensions, and deep psychological stress to themselves and their children. The 
price for material comfort is way too high to pay for broken families and children who are 
alienated from parents.  
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Although this study focuses on Chinese migrant family relationships in Beijing, the 
findings have broader implications on the social cost behind China’s rapid economic 
development. In just over thirty years, China has grown to hold the world’s second largest 
GDP after the U.S., but despite China’s effort to build a “harmonious society” – a 
philosophical concept rooted in Confucianism, and a political campaign launched by former 
president Hu Jintao during China’s 11th Five-Year Plan from 2006 to 2010 (Chan, 2010) – 
China ranks in the least equal 25% of countries worldwide. According to the Gini 
coefficient, the quantitative measure of inequality within a country – with 0 being perfectly 
equal, and 1 being completely unequal – wealth inequality in China rose from about 0.3 in 
the early 1980s to more than 0.45 in the early 2000s. After 2000, the Gini coefficient rose 
further to a high of 0.49 in 2008 (Li, Sato, Sicular, 2013). Since then it has declined slightly; 
in 2013, the Gini coefficient was measured at 0.42 (World Bank, 2013).  
When President Xi Jinping took over the leadership in 2012, China embarked on a new 
path to reinvigorate the Party’s rules. Modeling after Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I have a 
Dream” speech, President Xi Jinping projected his “Chinese Dream” at the Asia Annual 
Conference in 2013: 
“In November last year, the Communist Party of China held its 18th National Congress, 
which drew the blueprint for China's development in the years to come. The main goals we 
set for China are as follows: By 2020, China's GDP and per capita incomes for urban and 
rural residents will double the 2010 figures, and the building of a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects will be completed. By the mid-21st century, China will be turned into 
a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and 
harmonious; and the Chinese dream, namely, the great renewal of the Chinese nation, will 
be realized. Looking ahead, we are full of confidence in China's future.” (Boao Forum, 
2013) 
 
To achieve the “great renewal of the Chinese nation,” President Xi began with reestablishing 
the Party’s legitimacy by cracking down on dissidents and corrupt party officials. Since 
2012, China has intensified its oppression on freedom of expression, access to information, 
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as well as political and civil dissidents. These include jailing intellectuals; restricting the 
rights of ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs and the Tibetans; subjecting NGOs to intrusive 
inspection; blocking the coverage of sensitive issues, such as Occupy Hong Kong 
movement; blocking foreign news sources and social media, such as the New York Times, 
Bloomsburg, and Facebook; illegally detain party officials and civil rights activists, such as 
officials on suspicion of corruption charges, lawyers, and human rights activists. 
Moreover, President Xi’s anti-corruption slogan famously stated that both “tigers and 
flies” will be targeted for corruption charges, and he has made some anti-corruption progress 
by purging his political rivals. Many people see President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as a 
scheme to consolidate powers rather than making any meaningful changes to address 
inequalities. Rural lands continue to be grabbed without adequate compensation. Farmers 
continue to be intimidated when they petition for a fair settlement. Migrant workers are 
systemically discriminated in cities, and left-behind children are forced to pay the price for 
China’s rapid economic development.  
To shrink the economic inequality gap, policy makers need to branch out from the 
traditional narratives of economic development, measured by the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), technological advancement, military building, or social modernization, to include 
different forms of social development, such as investing in education, affordable healthcare, 
as well as raising minimum wage, and increase workforce protection.  
The challenges faced by Chinese migrant families in many ways mirror the obstacles 
immigrant families face worldwide: migrants’ mobility is limited due to the lack of legal 
status; as a result, their rights are striped away because neither the sending nor the receiving 
cities or countries are responsible for their well-beings; long separation from their children 
tears family bonding apart; neglect, poverty, and lack of parental guidance make migrant 
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children vulnerable to abuse, violence, and crime exposure. At the same time, Chinese 
government, like many other countries whose economy is built largely on the back of 
immigrant workers, continue to profit off of their toil, and fail to recognize the contribution 
of immigrant workers. 
As powerfully reasoned by Amartya Sen in Development as Freedom (1999), economic 
development is only one of the means in achieving the freedom enjoyed by members of 
society. The ultimate goal of development is to expand the freedom that human enjoy, and 
the means to achieve it, require the eradication of poverty, eliminating poor economic 
opportunities, and systemic deprivation of public services. The following section will list a 
few policy recommendations that aim to alleviate China’s growing inequalities. 
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VI. Policy Recommendations 
Figure 12: Groups celebrating the October 1 National Holiday. Source: Qiao Li, 2014 
 
 
China’s rural-urban and intra-urban inequalities reflect the long-term consequences of 
past and current institutional discriminations that have long favored the growth of cities and 
urbanites, at the expense of rural peasants and migrant workers. Such discrimination has led 
to unequal access to education, employment, and social welfare benefits for rural migrant 
families who work and live in urban cities. To address these rural-urban disparities, China 
has tried to implement policies in its 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans. In China’s upcoming 
13th Five-Year Plan, which will be launched in 2016, focus will also be placed on improving 
quality of lives (Shen, 2014). 
China’s 11th Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010 focused primarily on fostering economic 
growth, reducing energy consumption and carbon emission, and building a “harmonious 
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society” through strengthening public service. However, very little was focused on 
improving the lives of migrant workers and their families.  
In terms of strengthening public service, some examples from the 11th Five-Year Plan 
include raising the years of education per capital up from 8.5 years to nine years; increasing 
pension coverage for retirees with urban hukou; working to raise medical coverage from 
23.5 percent to over 80 percent in rural China (Yan, 2006).  
When it comes to addressing rural-urban migration, the 11th Five-Year Plan also 
advocated for a rational (heli) but stratified (fenli) model of urbanization. Specifically, the 
Plan encouraged individuals to engage in “both industries and farming, circular flows 
between city and countryside” (yigoing yinong, chengxiang shuangxiang liudong) (Fan, 
2006). Such strategy would encourage more rural migrants to permanently settle in second 
and third-tiered cities rather than crowding megacities like Beijing or Shanghai. 
In the 12th Five-Year Plan, polices were aimed to promote the equalization of basic 
public service, minimize the gaps between rural and urban living standards, and accelerate 
the growth the rural and urban income (Confederation of British Industries, 2011). 
Though existing policies focus on both rural and urban growth, they do not directly 
address rural migrants’ needs in urban cities. Policies aim to manage migrant population in 
urban cities rather than improving their living conditions and supporting family cohesion. To 
mediate inequality and promote healthier family growth, Chinese national government must 
address the following issues: 
Issue 1: Incentives to draw talents to smaller cities, townships, and countryside.  
Recommendation: National government should give more incentives, such as higher 
pay, housing offer, or better retirement benefits to encourage aspired and talented 
individuals to take jobs in smaller cities, particularly for healthcare and teaching jobs. Many 
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Beijing residents complain about their hospital being overcrowded with rich villagers, 
because healthcare services are so poor in smaller towns. Chinese national government 
should stop favoring its global cities, and focus on building the rest of the country.  
 
Issue 2: Equalizing hukou privilege  
Recommendation: Migrant workers and parents in Beijing should be able to afford 
medical care if they are sick. Should migrant parents decide to bring their children to the 
city, either short-term or long-term, their children need to have affordable education. In 
addition, equal college admission standard must be guaranteed. Students who do not hold 
urban hukou should not be punished with higher testing score requirement. Some urban 
residents may worry such leniency will bring flocks of migrants into cities, but their 
concerns will be mitigated if smaller towns and villages are growing with well-equipped 
social services, as it will increase the likelihood for migrant families to return.  
 
Issue 3: NGO’s involvement in urban migrant schools  
Recommendation: National government should encourage NGO’s involvement with 
migrant children’s education in urban cities. NGOs offer many opportunities to enrich 
migrant children’s learning experience. They often provide supplementary teaching and 
after-school tutoring services for migrant schools that have limited money and resources. 
NGOs also serve as the community liaison that link aspired individuals with projects that 
promote positive changes. NGOs can help to build stronger communities by cultivating 
shared responsibilities and compassion.  
 
Issue 4: Upholding the rule of law 
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Recommendation: National, provincial, and local governments must respect, and obey 
the rule of law. The New Marriage Law of 1950, superseded by the Second Marriage Law of 
1980, set out guidelines to protect women’s right to choose her partner, and the right to 
divorce. In practice, women continue to be pressured into marriages, their interests are 
unprotected in the event of a divorce, and they continue to be looked down upon when they 
get a divorce. Government must provide guidelines to implement laws in order to eliminate 
unfair and abusive practices. 
 
The legacies of China’s unfair social policies compounded with its relentless pursuit for 
economic development, left President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang with continually 
evolving social and political challenges. As China emerges onto the world stage, President 
Xi Jinping will have to guide his inflexible and opaque government with creative solutions, 
to prevent any potential social, economic, and political instability.
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Appendix 
Glossary Terms 
 
Dagongmei (打工妹) – factory girls 
Dayu (大禹) – Yu the Great in ancient mythology 
Guanxi (?系) – people-to-people relationships  
Guanxixue (?系学) – the art and study of people-to-people relationships 
Guojia Tongjiju (国家统计局) – National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
Hukou (户口) – Household Registration System (Hukou) 
Rendingshengtian (人定胜天) – Man can conquer nature 
Renmai (人脉) – personal connection 
Zhongguo (中国) – People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
Zhongguo Gongchandang （中国共产党） – Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
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Interviewees’ Demographic Information 
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Sample Semi-structured Questionnaires 
 
Questions for Migrant Parents with Left-behind Children 
Name: 
Age: 
How many years have you been in Beijing? What do you do?  
How is your job? What are some of the things you like about your job? What aspects 
make it hard?  
How many days do you work? How much do you make a month? How are you treated at 
work?  
Are you married? Is your spouse in Beijing too? 
Do you have children? Are they in Beijing? 
When was the last time your saw your children? How long have you been a migrant 
worker? Where else did you work before coming to Beijing?  
Who’s taking care of your children? Are they okay and supportive of your decision to 
leave your children behind?  
Are your parents healthy and well? How many siblings do you have? What were the 
economic conditions you grew up in? What was the highest educational degree you 
received? What was the reason for you to leave school?  
Are your children in school? How are they doing in school?  
Are your children rebellious? How did you find out? What did you do or do you plan to 
do address this?  
Do you have difficulties communicating with your children from a distance? How do 
you exercise parental supervision from afar?  
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When you miss your children, what do you do? How do you cope with this separation? 
What are some of your goals and plans after working in Beijing? Going home? Bring 
children and spouse along to Beijing? Move to a smaller city with family closer to home?  
 
Questions for Migrant Parents Who Have Brought their Children to Beijing: 
Name: 
Age: 
How many years have you been in Beijing? What do you do?  
How is your job? What are some of the things you like about your job? What aspects 
make it hard?  
How many days do you work? How much do you make a month? How are you treated at 
work?  
Are you married? Is your spouse in Beijing too? 
Do you have children? Are they in Beijing? 
Were you separated from your children for a period of time? How many years ago was 
that? How old are your children now?  
Are your children in school? How are they doing in class?  
What did you do to help your children do well/improve in class? Was it difficult to 
communicate with your children after reunification? How is your relationship now with your 
children?  
Do you feel appreciated by your family and children for what you have done for them? 
Did you come to Beijing to create a better future for them? Was it worth it? Now that your 
children are here with you, what do you work for now?   
What are some of your hopes for your children?  
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Questions for Now-Adult Children: 
Name: 
Age: 
What do you study in Beijing? Where do you work?  
Your mom/dad spoke proudly of you. Do you feel they understand you? Why or why 
not?  
Was it difficult to communicate with your parent(s) while they were away? How did you 
cope with that?  
Were you rebellious during their time away? Did you make trouble? How did it go 
down?  
Was it difficult to communicate with your parent(s) after reuniting? How did you cope 
with that?  
What do you want to do after graduation or in the next five years? 
Would you ever consider being a migrant worker like your parent? Perhaps more skilled 
and work in a place where you can make more than your parents. How would you raise your 
children? Would you leave them behind for a while?  
  
 
